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Richard Blundel   
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
This chapter provides an outline of the origins and principal features of critical realist social 
theory, followed by a focused review of the methodological implications of this philosophical 
perspective. The primary purpose of the chapter is to consider why critical realism might offer a 
suitable ‘vehicle’ for qualitative research in the field of entrepreneurship, and to assess its 
explanatory potential with reference to recent empirical studies informed by a realist 
perspective. The concluding section is a reflection on the issues faced by researchers who are 
considering critical realism against alternative approaches, together with suggestions for further 
reading. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter two introduced the principal paradigms available to entrepreneurship 
researchers, and also highlighted some broad ontological and epistemological themes 
concerning the potential choice of methodological ‘vehicle’ for a particular study. In the 
present chapter, I consider how one of the more widely-cited social theoretic paradigms, 
critical realism, might be employed. The opening section comprises a brief account of 
the critical realism (‘CR’) in the context of social science research, which outlines its 
principal features, indicates its distinctive ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
and locates CR in relation to its antecedents and to some competing approaches. The 
central section includes a more focused appraisal of CR as the basis for research 
methodology, including its relevance to qualitative research in the entrepreneurship 
field [1].  The discussion is illustrated with examples of recent empirical work that has 
been informed by a CR perspective. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the 
methodological issues facing researchers who may be considering the use of CR against 
rival approaches and some suggestions for further reading.  
 
RESEARCHING IN A CRITICAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
Origins and development 
 
The philosophical perspective now widely known as critical realism has gained in 
prominence over the last thirty years, during which it has made a transition from the 
natural sciences into social theory, leading to applications in various fields of social 
science. The core concepts of CR reflect a long tradition of realist philosophy, but its 
more recent development can be traced to the work of two philosophers of science, Rom 
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Harré and Roy Bhaskar. Harré’s influential (1972) The philosophies of science and 
Bhaskar’s (1975) A realist philosophy of science, established what was termed a 
‘transcendental realist’ view of the relationship between the nature of human knowledge 
and that of objects of investigation in the natural sciences. In his (1979) work, The 
possibility of naturalism, Bhaskar extended these principles to the realm of the social 
sciences. In doing so, he reworked the term, ‘naturalism’, referring to the claim that 
there can be a unity of method between the natural and social sciences, into a ‘critical 
naturalism’, which acknowledges real differences in the nature of the objects 
investigated. The core ideas of CR flow from this combination of transcendental realism 
and critical naturalism.  
The underlying position is that social scientists are engaged in a similar project to 
their counterparts in the natural sciences, but that researching social phenomena requires 
a distinctive set of methodological tools. Empirical researchers have attempted to apply, 
adapt and refine CR’s philosophical propositions in various fields, including: economic 
geography (Sayer and Morgan 1986); economics (Lawson 1997, Fleetwood 1999); and 
organisation studies (Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000, Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004), 
resulting in many different perspectives and emphases (Danermark et al. 2002: 1). 
Underlying this variety is a common concern with a central question in social science, 
human agency and its relationship with social structure. This concern can be traced back 
to the rise of CR, which was associated with the rejection of ‘structuralist’ grand 
narratives, and corresponding efforts to recognise the role that knowledge and meaning 
played among human actors. Interestingly, in relation to qualitative research methods, 
much of the growing interest in CR appears to have been stimulated by direct 
experience in the field. For example, like other researchers in urban, regional and 
industrial studies, Andrew Sayer (2000: 5) found it impossible to reconcile the richness, 
complexity and sheer variety encountered in concrete social worlds with the tidy 
abstractions demanded by the ‘all-embracing, all-explaining’ discourses of this period. 
CR offered a ‘middle way’ for social scientific research, avoiding both reductionist 
forms of modernism, that took little or no account of interpretive understanding, and the 
problems of relativism and incommensurablity that followed from postmodernism’s 
discursive ‘turn’ (ibid: 67-80) [2]. 
 
Principal features 
 
The aim of this section is to introduce some of the principal features of CR that readers 
are likely to encounter in the literature, using relatively straightforward language and 
illustrations. It is clearly impossible to encompass a philosophical position in a few 
short paragraphs, without omitting or compressing many of the complex arguments 
upon which it is based. Consequently, I have focused attention on the methodological 
aspects of CR, taking the viewpoint of a researcher who may be considering this 
paradigm for a particular empirical study. The discussion is divided into four parts. The 
first two parts deal with CR’s world-view, introducing the terms: ‘structures’, 
‘mechanisms’, ‘causal powers’, ‘stratification’ and ‘emergence’. The remaining parts 
discuss ‘critical naturalism’, the focal concept that connects CR to its philosophical 
roots in the natural sciences, and ‘retroduction’, CR’s distinctive mode of scientific 
inference and explanation. Each part is illustrated with examples from the natural and 
social worlds, see Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1  Principal features of CR: structure of the argument 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structures, mechanisms and causal powers. The term ‘structure’ refers to the way an 
object is constituted. Hence, the structure of a natural object, such as a water molecule, 
is based on the fusing of one hydrogen atom with two oxygen atoms. Similarly, a social 
object, such as an entrepreneurial network, is based on interactions between individual 
human beings. By virtue of its structure, any object has certain ‘causal powers’. These 
are the things that an object is able to do, or more broadly, its, ‘potentials, capacities, or 
abilities to act in certain ways and/or to facilitate various activities and developments.’ 
(Lawson 1997: 21). Hence, water has the capacity to extinguish a fire and an 
entrepreneurial network can form the basis for a series of different ventures over time 
(Johannisson 2000). Critical realists also make use of the term ‘mechanisms’ when 
referring to the ways that the causal powers of an object are exercised. These 
mechanisms are sometimes described as ‘generative’, in the sense they can give rise to 
concrete phenomena, such as an event that we might experience.  However, activation 
of causal powers is not automatic, since it depends on the presence of other conditions. 
Hence, as Sayer (2000: 58) has noted, ‘a particular mechanism can produce completely 
different actions at different time, and inversely, the same event can have completely 
different causes’. To take a highly simplified example, two individuals might have 
similar capacities to become successful entrepreneurs, yet due to differing conditions 
(e.g. prevailing socio-economic conditions in their respective home regions), only one 
of them might realise her potential. Another implication is that similar events can be the 
product of an entirely different pattern of causes. Distinguishing these ‘contingent’ 
relationships between mechanisms is central to CR’s view of causation as depicted in 
Figure 3.2 [3] . 
 
Figure 3.2  A critical realist view of causation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Sayer (2000: 15, Figure 1.2). 
event/ effect 
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conditions (other mechanisms) 
Critical realist ‘world view’ 
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Stratification and emergence. CR asserts that the social world consists of real objects 
that exist independently of our knowledge and concepts, and whose structures, 
mechanisms and powers are often far from transparent. This reflects a well-established 
realist tenet concerning the independence of the world from our thoughts about it (Sayer 
2000: 10). As Danermark et al. (2002: 20) have noted, the CR proposition that reality 
has hidden depths is hardly remarkable. It is not only a prerequisite for scientific 
activity, but also part of everyday experience, when people conjecture amongst 
themselves as to what may be going on ‘behind’ or ‘beneath the surface of’ an observed 
event (e.g. after witnessing extreme weather conditions, or the decline of an industrial 
district). However, CR does present researchers with a distinctive view of the world, 
and of their relationship to both natural and social phenomena. In Bhaskar’s (1975: 56) 
terms, reality consists of three domains, the empirical, the actual and the real.  The 
world of human experience and knowledge of events (the ‘empirical’ domain), is seen 
as ontologically distinct (i.e. separate and different) from the ‘actual’ domain in which 
events occur, irrespective or whether people have observed them. Thus, while different 
teams of climate scientists may produce competing theories about extreme weather 
events, the natural phenomena that they study remain the same (n.b. in the case of the 
social world this relationship with science is rather more complex; social phenomena 
are themselves products of human knowledge, so do not enjoy the same independent 
existence as their natural counterparts - see ‘critical naturalism’, below) [4].  The further 
distinction of a ‘real’ domain, comprising structures and associated mechanisms, signals 
CR’s decisive break with the so-called ‘flat’ ontologies, most commonly associated 
with empirical realist and interpretivist philosophies of science. Realists argue that these 
paradigms place inappropriate limits on the scope of scientific exploration of the social 
world, in the first instance ignoring anything that is unobservable by researchers, and in 
the second, confining research to the direct experiences or accounts of human actors 
(Sayer 2000: 11). Hence, from a CR perspective, an entrepreneur’s account of her 
experience in starting a new venture only provides a provisional starting-point for 
explanation (Bhaskar 1979: 80, Whittington 1989: 85-86).  One of the primary tasks of 
science is to probe beneath the ‘empirical’ and ‘actual’ domains in pursuit of generative 
mechanisms that occupy ontologically distinct strata. For human actors, the potential for 
agency arises from the resulting interactions between different strata: 
 
‘Just as for society as a whole, none of these strata provide any unique or dominant 
determination, but each presents a range of courses according to which actors can direct their 
activities. At the dinner table, guests are torn between the physiological drive of hunger, 
psychological tendencies towards greed and social pressures for delicate good manners.’ 
(Whittington 1989: 88 – emphasis added) 
 
In the case of entrepreneurship research, it has long been recognised that investigations 
restricted to single strata (e.g. explanations based on efforts to isolate the psychological 
traits of ‘successful’ entrepreneurs), are likely to prove unsatisfactory (cf. Low and 
Macmillan 1988, Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). However, this begs the question of how 
the properties of different strata are related to one another. CR’s response is the 
proposition that both the natural and social worlds are characterised by the concept of 
‘emergence’. This suggests that when the properties of different strata combine, they 
give rise to qualitatively new phenomena, or objects. More precisely, these new objects 
are emergent in the sense of possessing new properties – structures, causal powers and 
mechanisms – that depend upon, but cannot be reduced to, those of their constituents 
(Sayer 2000: 12-13, Danermark et al. 2002: 59-66). Bhaskar (1975: 169) illustrated this 
point by reconstructing the historical development of chemistry, in which an observable 
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chemical reaction was explained in terms of the properties of objects in successively 
‘deeper’ strata (i.e. electrons, sub-atomic particles). In this example, the structures and 
associated causal powers (i.e. chemical bonding) of the ‘higher’ strata are emergent, and 
therefore fundamentally different in nature, from those of the underlying strata. Social 
structures, their causal powers and mechanisms are seen as being similarly emergent 
from human interaction. For example, while recognising that entrepreneurial networks 
are a product of interaction between individuals, CR also directs attention to the new 
and non-reducible properties of the network itself, including its structural form, causal 
powers and the mechanisms through which these are exercised. Realists argue that 
disregard for stratification and emergent powers has undermined social research, 
contributing to reductionist explanations, the misidentification of causality and the 
perpetuation of territorial disputes between theories and disciplines (Sayer 1992: 120) 
[5].  
 
Critical naturalism. This concept derives from Bhaskar’s efforts to work through the 
implications of transcendental realism for the social sciences. Critical naturalism can be 
seen, in simple terms, as CR’s strategy for accommodating ‘messy’ and ‘ambiguous’ 
social phenomena, without abandoning the social scientific task. In common with 
interpretivists, and those who pursued the postmodern ‘turn’, critical realists have 
rejected ‘naturalism’, recognising that the social world cannot be understood in the 
same way as its natural counterpart (see also chapter four).  However, in contrast to 
these paradigms, realists have been unwilling to stop their search at the level of 
meaning, but prefer to see its interpretation as merely the starting point for the pursuit 
of deeper causal explanations [6]. The following short extracts from the literature 
indicate some of the more important differences that realists have attempted to address, 
as CR philosophy has been translated from the natural world in order to encompass 
social phenomena. For researchers, it has meant taking due account of distinguishing 
characteristics of the social world, including: the impact of intentionality on human 
action (i.e. our purposeful pursuit of perceived goals, such as happiness or profit); the 
emergent nature of social structures, such as marriage or organisation, which are both 
relatively autonomous and inherently meaningful; and the complex relationship between 
agency and structure that this implies: 
 
‘Our pursuit of a separate science in the social sphere, centred upon the intentionality of human 
agency and involving a recognition of the reality and relative autonomy of action-conditioning 
social structure, amounts to an acknowledgement of the irreducibility of society to nature.’ 
(Lawson 1997: 63) 
 
‘What does it mean to write of the social world?  The natural world is natural because it does not 
require action on behalf of human beings for its existence. The social world is social because, by 
contrast, it does require action on behalf of human beings for its existence.’ 
(Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000: 10) 
 
‘Critical realism acknowledges that social phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, and hence 
that meaning is not only externally descriptive of them but constitutive of them (though of 
course there are usually material constituents too). Meaning has to be understood, it cannot be 
measured or counted, and hence there is always an interpretive or hermeneutic element in social 
science.’  
(Sayer 2000: 17)   
 
In summary, while the causal powers of natural objects, such as weather systems, are 
exercised ‘mindlessly’, without any (self-conscious) sense of meaning, interpretation 
and intent, those of social objects, such as entrepreneurial activities, display these 
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characteristics in abundance. The implication is that social scientists need to engage in a 
so-called ‘double hermeneutic’, generating explanatory knowledge about phenomena 
that are themselves ‘knowing’, in contrast to their natural science counterparts, whose 
subject-matter is ‘unknowing’. This highlights a central tension arising from CR’s 
ontology. Given the proposition that science seeks to explain a world consisting of 
‘real’ objects, which in CR terms represent the ‘intransitive’ or objective dimension of 
knowledge, how is it to incorporate this ‘transitive’ or subjective dimension?  Bhaskar’s 
(1975) concept of critical naturalism acts as the conceptual bridge between these 
competing demands: 
 
‘[C]ritical realism is only partly naturalist,  for although social science can use the same methods 
as natural science regarding causal explanation, it must also diverge from them in using 
“verstehen” or interpretive understanding. While natural scientists necessarily have to enter the 
hermeneutic circle of their scientific community, social scientists also have to enter that of those 
whom they study.’ 
(Sayer 2000: 17) 
 
It is clear that the concept of critical naturalism represents a far-reaching 
methodological challenge to empirical researchers (Danermark et al. 2002: 38-39). 
Consequently, any conclusions that we reach regarding the empirical application of 
critical naturalism are likely to be central to our assessment of CR as a suitable ‘vehicle’ 
for entrepreneurship research. 
 
Retroduction. CR has adopted a distinctive form of scientific inference, termed 
‘retroduction’, which involves the explanation of events in the social world by seeking 
to discern the structures and mechanisms that are capable of producing them (Sayer 
1992: 107). This explanatory task involves quite different methodological operations to 
those associated with ‘induction’ and ‘deduction’ [7].  Consider, for example, a research 
project investigating the growth of entrepreneurial firms: inductive inference might 
move from a series of similar observations to an empirical generalisation such as, ‘rapid 
growth is associated with variables X, Y and Z.’; deductive inference might move from 
a set of premises, such as the existence of certain variables to a conclusion their 
implications for growth in a particular case; while retroductive inference would move 
from the description and abstract analysis of the growth process as a concrete 
phenomenon to a reconstruction of the basic conditions (i.e. the structures, causal 
powers and mechanisms) that make it possible [8].  Retroduction involves a type of 
scientific generalisation that is concerned with the isolation of fundamental structures 
whose powers can be said to act ‘transfactually’ (i.e. continuing to exist, even though 
their operations may not be manifested at the level of events or observations). Its 
‘analytical’ approach to generalisation contrasts sharply with the more common type 
associated with inductive inference, which focuses on the extrapolation of empirical 
regularities (Danermark et al. 2002: 77) (Figure 3.3). As a consequence, retroduction 
requires different scientific methods in order to achieve its purposes (Easton 2000: 214). 
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Figure 3. 3  Two types of generalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Danermark et al. (2002: 77, Figure 3) 
 
So what are the implications of retroduction for the working practices of social 
scientists?   Some of the more important issues can be illustrated with reference to an 
imaginary research study involving case studies of entrepreneurial firms. First, in their 
effort to reflect the inherent complexity of concrete phenomena, the researchers are 
likely to draw on multiple sources of data, which may comprise various types of 
qualitative evidence, derived from ethnography, observation, in-depth interview, 
historical and archival research, as well as some quantitative evidence, such as industry 
statistics. Second, in selecting cases, the researchers are guided by the requirements of 
analytical, rather than empirical, generalisation. This means that they select cases in 
order to explore and to clarify the necessary and contingent relationships between 
structures (Danermark et al. 2002: 105). To achieve this, their selection might include 
some extreme or ‘pathological’ cases, where firms have experienced major transitions 
or crises (Bhaskar 1979: 48, Collier 1994: 165). In addition, they pay considerable 
attention to both the spatial and temporal boundaries of case-based research, in an effort 
to ensure that wider structural conditions are addressed (Whittington 1989: 85). Third, 
in sifting through their rich idiographic sources, the researchers incorporate the accounts 
of human actors, not simply in their own terms, but as part of the search for the ‘rules’ 
that constitute these accounts (Tsoukas 1989: 555). For example, the researchers treat 
entrepreneurs’ statements about the perceived constraints of the growth of their firms as 
a starting-point for a retroductive probing of the structural preconditions of these 
perceptions. Lastly, the study itself proceeds through several iterations, with the 
researchers moving repeatedly between more concrete and more abstract activities in 
order to refine their explanation. In Tsoukas’s (1989: 558) terms, the are moving 
concurrently on two tracks, one of which is ‘up in the clouds’, and concerned with 
abstraction and theoretical conceptualisation, while the other is ‘down to earth’, 
engaged in the idiosyncratic details of the case material. The process has been described 
in a model comprising five distinct but closely-related activities (Danermark et al. 2002: 
109-111) (Table 3.1). As the authors have emphasised, the model is not prescriptive, nor 
does it imply a strictly linear process.  The emphasis on different activities is also bound 
to vary, according to the nature of a particular research project, as are the actual 
research methods employed (ibid: 109, 73). However, it provides a concise summary of 
Empirical extrapolation 
E1      E2     E3    E4    E5     . . . . . . . . . .  En 
Empirical 
phenomena/ 
events 
Transfactual 
argumentation/ 
retroductive 
inference 
Transfactual conditions/ fundamental structures 
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the preceding discussion, illustrating the distinctively retroductive methodological 
implications that social scientists have derived from the CR paradigm. 
 
Table 3.1  An explanatory research process involving retroduction 
 
Activity Nature of activity 
1: 
Description 
Prepare a description of the phenomenon, making use of 
actors’ accounts and a variety of other sources. 
2: 
Analytical resolution 
Distinguish various components, aspects or dimensions of the 
phenomenon and establish (tentative) boundaries to the 
components studied. 
3: 
Theoretical redescription 
Interpret and redescribe the different components, applying 
contrasting theoretical frameworks and interpretations in order 
to provide new insights (n.b. this activity is sometimes referred 
to as ‘abduction’). 
4: 
Retroduction 
For each component, seek to identify basic, or ‘transfactual’ 
conditions, including structures, causal powers and 
mechanisms, that make the phenomenon possible.  
5: 
Abstract comparison 
Elaborate and estimate the explanatory power of the structures, 
causal powers and mechanisms that have been identified 
during activities 3 and 4.  
6: 
Concretization and 
contextualization 
Examine how different structures, causal powers and 
mechanisms manifest themselves in concrete situations. 
Source: Danermark et al. (2002: 109-111, Table 4 – modified). Note: the term ‘activities’ has been 
substituted for the original ‘stages’ in order to emphasise the non-linear nature of the process. 
 
The remaining sections of the chapter aim to add some substance to this brief, and 
necessarily schematic account of CR methodology. The transition from philosophy to 
practical fieldwork is made in two stages. The first comprises some general arguments 
for CR, and their relationship to current empirical and conceptual issues in the 
entrepreneurship literature. The second includes three examples of recent empirical 
studies that draw, to varying degrees, on a realist paradigm. This two-stage approach 
allows us to consider both the ‘hypothetical’ case for CR in our field, and the current 
state-of-play, as reflected in published research. 
 
IS CRITICAL REALISM RELEVANT TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH? 
 
In this section, I discuss several reasons why the critical realist paradigm might provide 
a suitable vehicle for entrepreneurship research, with specific reference to qualitative 
approaches. As the editors have indicated, the methodological debate in our field is at 
best at a highly provisional stage. With this in mind, I have presented the material in the 
form of a rhetorical case for CR-inspired research, intended to stimulate discussion (n.b. 
critics and alternative approaches are addressed in a later section). The argument builds 
on five themes: first, that CR that can help to revive a longstanding realist tradition in 
entrepreneurship research; second, that CR can promote the much-needed 
contexutalisation of entrepreneurial phenomena in research studies; third, that CR can 
facilitate greater theoretical integration between disciplines and across multiple levels of 
analysis; fourth, that CR can enhance the explanatory potential of existing qualitative 
research techniques, including the case study approaches; and fifth, that as a 
9 | P a g e  
 
consequence, CR has the potential to contribute more ‘useful’ knowledge than rival 
paradigms. 
 
Reviving a realist tradition 
 
Realism has long intellectual roots in entrepreneurship research, and its contributory 
disciplines (Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000: 9, Swedberg 2000: 12-18). For example, it is 
possible to detect a common thread of ideas in ecomomics, emerging out of its 
polarisation in the Methodenstreit (i.e. battle over methods) at the end of the 19th 
century. The pioneering sociologist, Max Weber, proposed a new approach to overcome 
the divide between an overly-abstract, non-historical version of economics, and an 
overly-historical, non-theoretical one. Weber’s Sozialökonomik, an attempt to synthesise 
history with theory, had a great impact on Joseph Schumpeter’s thinking (Swedberg 
1991: 83-89), including his approach to entrepreneurship:  
 
‘[The] sociology of enterprise reaches much further than is implied in questions concerning the 
conditions that produce and shape, favour or inhibit entrepreneurial activity. It extends to the 
structure and the very foundations of capitalist society.’  
(Schumpeter 1951: 224-225) 
 
Schumpeter’s ideas influenced Edith Penrose, whose seminal (1959) study, The Theory 
of the Growth of the Firm, reflects a similar realist concern with uncovering structures 
and mechanisms, and specifically those ignored by mainstream economics in its ‘black 
box’ treatment of the firm. Penrose’s interest was sparked by involvement in a 
substantial piece of qualitative research, examining the growth of a former subsidiary of 
Du Pont (Penrose 1960). Her eclectic theory incorporates a subtle treatment of meaning 
and intentionality in human actors (i.e. the dynamics of entrepreneurial judgement at the 
level of the managerial team, encapsulated in her concept of ‘productive opportunity’), 
but also acknowledges the relative autonomy of environmental selection mechanisms 
[9]: 
 
‘“Expectations” and not “objective facts” are the immediate determinants of a firm’s behaviour, 
although there may be a relationship between expectations and “facts” - indeed there must be if 
action is to be successful... In the last analysis the “environment” rejects or confirms the 
soundness of the judgements about it, but the relevant environment is not an objective fact 
discoverable before the event’. 
(Penrose 1959: 41) 
 
Penrose’s emphasis on the subjective element, whereby firm behaviour is, in the first 
instance, the product of an ‘image’ of the environment in the mind of the entrepreneur 
(Boulding 1956), contrasts with much of the later resource-based literature. However, 
by elaborating her theory, she helped to perpetuate a strand of research that retains a 
strong realist flavour (e.g. Lawson and Lorenz 1999, Best 2001). Investigations may 
start at the level of entrepreneurial perceptions, but their scope should be much broader; 
researchers are challenged to discover how the phenomenon that Penrose conceptualised 
as ‘productive opportunity’ articulates with other structures and mechanisms. 
 
Contextualising entrepreneurship 
 
Critical realism raises questions about the pre-conditions for social phenomena. It is 
therefore well-placed to frame an investigation into contextual and process issues. In 
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considering the context in which entrepreneurship occurs, we begin to raise important 
questions about the boundaries, both temporal and spatial, of our research: 
 
‘We need to know not only what the main strategies were of actors, but what it was about the context 
which enabled them to be successful or otherwise. This is consistent with the realist concept of 
causation and requires us […] to decide what it was about a certain context which allowed a certain 
action to be successful. Often the success or failure of agents’ strategies may have little or nothing to 
do with their own reasons and intentions’.  
(Sayer 2000: 26) 
 
Many contributors have called for greater attention to be paid to the context in which 
entrepreneurial activity takes place (Low and Macmillan 1988, Zafirovski 1999, 
Ucbasaran et al. 2001). For example, entrepreneurial networks have been identified as 
important contextual phenomena that display degrees of social embeddedness 
(Granovetter 1985, Johannisson and Monsted 1997) and latency (Ramachandran and 
Ramnarayan 1993). Network-based case studies have also been used to deconstruct the 
(culturally-conditioned) myth of entrepreneurs as ‘heroic’ individuals (Jones and 
Conway 2000). However, leading figures continue to argue that interaction between 
entrepreneurial activity and the broader context is a relatively underdeveloped research 
area (Acs and Audretsch 2003: 329, Davidsson and Wilkund 2001: 81-12). The 
potential contribution of CR is to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the context 
in which entrepreneurs exercise strategic choice; CR’s mechanisms-based paradigm is 
seen as a moderating influence on excessively voluntaristic (and deterministic) accounts 
of entrepreneurial agency (Whittington 1989: 75). Building on CR’s methodological 
precepts, entrepreneurial research should be capable of better spatial and temporal 
explanations, tracing the changing ‘zones of manoeuvre’ of entrepreneurial firms as 
they interact with the competitive capacities of their contexts (Clark 2000: 303-313). 
 
Integrating different levels of analysis 
 
Entrepreneurship research has blossomed in many academic disciplines, including 
psychology, anthropology, organisation studies, geography, economic history and 
economics.  These activities have generated a rich and diverse harvest of empirical and 
conceptual material. However, this variety masks the fact that the field is fragmented, 
with specialists making little use of one another’s work (Ucbasaran et al. 2001: 57). 
Furthermore, in pursuing the methodologies traditionally associated with these 
disciplines, entrepreneurship researchers have tended to focus their attention on 
particular levels of analysis. In their comprehensive review of ‘past research and future 
challenges’, Low and MacMillan (1988: 151-152) suggested that entrepreneurship 
researchers may choose among five levels of analysis in pursuit of relevant phenomena: 
the individual, group, organisational, industrial and societal. They noted a tendency for 
most previous research to be conducted at a single level of analysis, but argued that a 
few recent examples of multi-level research (e.g. Aldrich and Auster 1986), 
demonstrated the potential for achieving a richer understanding of entrepreneurship 
processes. This led them to conclude that both entrepreneurship research designs would 
be enriched if they were able to incorporate multiple levels of analysis: 
 
‘The relationships between phenomena that can be observed at different levels of analysis are 
important not just for academics, but for both practitioners and public policy makers as well. 
From the entrepreneur’s perspective, the success of the individual enterprise will be affected by 
factors that can only be observed at different levels of analysis. To miss any one of these 
perspectives increases the probability that key factors will be overlooked and that unanticipated 
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events will take the entrepreneur by surprise. From the public policy-maker’s perspective, the 
insights generated by multi-level studies have the potential to improve targeting of government 
efforts to encourage successful entrepreneurship.’  
(Low and Macmillan 1988: 152 - emphasis added) 
 
However, Davidsson and Wiklund’s (2001) review of current research practice, based 
on a content analysis of articles published in leading US and European entrepreneurship 
journals, revealed that research was dominated by micro-level analysis, with integrated 
‘micro/aggregate mix’ approaches continuing to represent a small proportion of 
published work. While our diverse and primarily single-level research programmes have 
given rise to recurrent debates over the relative importance of, for example, 
psychological, organisational and socio-cultural dimensions of entrepreneurship, they 
have achieved little empirical or conceptual integration (Frank and Landström 1997; 
Davidsson et al. 2001). For example, entrepreneurship researchers employ a variety of 
strategies to build or refine process theories. Each seeks to understand ‘patterns in 
events’, but methodologies differ in the extent to which they probe beyond observed 
events (i.e. surface-level effects) in order to understand underlying causal sequences or 
generating mechanisms (Pentland 1999). This is not to deny the many insights into 
entrepreneurial processes that have already been achieved. For example, population 
ecologists have made productive use of a single-level methodology, exploring macro-
level processes with data that is primarily aggregated and quantitative (i.e. official 
statistical data sets recording firm entries and exits) (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986, Staber 
1997). Similarly, ethnographic researchers, who also tend to apply a single-level 
methodology, have revealed richly-detailed micro-level processes through direct 
exposure to localised fieldwork sites, making imaginative use of qualitative research 
methods (i.e. observing entrepreneurs and recording their perceptions and behaviours) 
(Ram 1999). Rather, as proponents would argue, a CR-inspired methodology is capable 
of taking entrepreneurship research a step further, supporting new research strategies 
better geared to achieve integration across its traditional divides (cf. Layder 1993, 
Danermark et al. 2002) [10].  
 
Enhancing qualitative research 
 
CR is compatible with a range of qualitative research methods. Its potential role in 
relation to qualitative evidence can be illustrated with reference to one of the leading 
texts in this field (Miles and Huberman 1994). As the authors suggest, the decision to 
adopt a realist perspective may have little impact on data collection. However, research 
strategies will be affected by the imperatives of critical naturalism and retroductive 
analysis: 
 
‘Human relationships and societies have peculiarities that make a realist approach to 
understanding them more complex - but not impossible. Unlike researchers in physics, we must 
contend with institutions, structures, practices and conventions that people reproduce and 
transform [...] Things that are believed become real and can be inquired into.’  
(Miles and Huberman 1994: 4) 
 
Though it has few references to Bhaskar and Harré, this widely-adopted sourcebook has 
added considerable substance to CR’s earlier methodological reflections. For example, 
its approach to ‘within case displays’ illustrates some of the challenges in causal 
explanation, contrasting investigations that are limited to a single level of analysis to 
more complex, multi-level approaches. The authors argue that qualitative research 
methods are particularly amenable to this type of causal analysis: 
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‘Qualitative analysis, with its close-up look, can identify mechanisms, going beyond sheer 
association. It is unrelentingly local, and deals well with the complex network of events and 
processes in a situation. It can sort out the temporal dimension, showing clearly what preceded 
what, either through direct observation or retrospection. It is well-equipped to cycle back and 
forth between variables and processes - showing that “stories” are not capricious, but include 
underlying variables, and that variables are not disembodied, but have connections over time.’ 
(Miles and Huberman 1994: 147) 
 
These techniques are broadly consistent with a CR position, and suggest that researchers 
should proceed through a combination of what they term a ‘variable-oriented’ 
conceptual approach (i.e. looking for patterns, or configurations in the data), and a 
‘process-oriented’ approach (i.e. assembling chronologies, or stories). The overall 
emphasis is towards retroductive inference: 
 
‘[We are] proposing that answering good “why” and “how” questions requires us to go beyond 
sheer association to seeing the actual mechanisms of influence in a bounded local setting, which 
are always multifold, operating over time.’ 
(Miles and Huberman 1994: 170) 
 
The implication, which echoes the previous argument concerning multi-level analysis, 
is that a CR-inspired methodology can contribute to better outcomes when researchers 
are employing qualitative research methods. More specifically, by highlighting the role 
of unobserved social structures, causal powers and mechanisms, the CR ontology can 
act as a counterbalance to the ‘micro-sociological’ tendencies of context-specific 
qualitative approaches such as ethnography (Porter 2002: 142, 157). Relatedly, CR’s 
fundamental concern with explaining why things occur, and with analysis through a 
process of retroductive inference, can challenge researchers to move beyond the 
description of social situations to a more critical assessment of the relationship between 
structural factors and human agency (ibid: 156-157). 
 
Generating more ‘useful’ knowledge 
 
In order to intervene successfully in the world, it is useful to obtain a working 
knowledge of the relevant structures and generative mechanisms. Or, to paraphrase 
Kant’s widely-cited aphorism, ‘There is nothing so practical as a good theory.’  The 
principal advantage of CR’s retroductive methodology, from the perspective of the 
policy-maker or practitioner, is that its purpose is to develop a theoretical understanding 
of real mechanisms, and the contingent ways in which they combine to generate effects 
(e.g. Subramaniyam 2000). While isolated, subjective accounts of entrepreneurial 
agency may be engaging, they have no referent and therefore lack cumulative 
explanatory power. With its concern for underlying structure rather than surface-level 
correlations, its opposition to excessive voluntarism and determinism, and its critique of 
reductionist explanations, CR seems well-placed to deliver a more informed – though, it 
has to be conceded, not always ‘actionable’ – understanding of concrete situations. At 
present, it is difficult to substantiate this argument, given the limited number of 
published studies that combine a CR methodology with an explicit policy orientation. 
However, some provisional conclusions may be drawn from three cases presented in the 
next section, which illustrate contrasting empirical applications of a broadly realist 
perspective. 
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APPLYING CRITICAL REALISM IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 
 
The empirical challenge 
 
This section provides examples to illustrate the proposition that research drawing on a 
CR perspective is capable of delivering more informed explanations of entrepreneurial 
activity. It reflects repeated calls to move beyond conceptual integration and attempt to 
replicate it in concrete, empirical research (Aldrich and Martinez 2001: 51). I will focus 
on three studies, each reflecting different aspects of the entrepreneurial networks 
agenda: Best’s (2001) analysis of the dynamics of entrepreneurial firms and regional 
clusters is not explicitly critical realist in approach, yet displays realism’s capacity for 
integration across multiple levels of analysis; Jones’s (2001) examination of divergent 
strategies of technology- and content-driven entrepreneurs in the early years of the US 
film industry combines realism with a narrative approach; and Bowey and Easton’s 
(2003) study adopts a CR methodology to explain changes in social capital in 
relationships between entrepreneurs and other actors. The aim is to connect the 
methodological debate to concrete research practices, noting both the limitations and 
potential of the paradigm [11].  
 
The dynamics of entrepreneurial clusters 
 
Michael Best’s recent work addresses ‘cluster dynamics’, defined as, ‘interactive 
processes of capability development and specialization within and amongst firms within 
a region.’ (Best 2001: ix). It forms part of a research tradition concerned with processes 
of entrepreneurship, learning and adaptation both within and beyond the boundaries of 
the firm (Penrose 1959, Richardson 1972, Lawson and Lorenz 1999). Best’s systems 
integration model extends the spatial and temporal scope of the (neo-Penrosian) 
‘technology capability and market opportunity’ mechanism and suggests how it might 
articulate with other mechanisms operating at several distinct levels of analysis (Figure 
3.4). The resulting analysis of capability development in industrial districts may be 
interpreted, in CR terms, as highlighting the role of pre-existing structures and their 
associated latent causal powers, while also isolating the contingent relationships that 
can to these powers being exercised: 
This model has been applied empirically to explain the changing fortunes of 
regional clusters, including the resurgence of high technology manufacturing in eastern 
Massachusetts and emerging cluster dynamics in the Malaysian electronics sector [12].   
  
‘An industrial district, unlike any single firm, offers the potential for new and unplanned technology 
combinations that tap a variety and range of production-related activities. This protean character of 
technological capability, particularly evident in the high tech sectors, is a feature of industrial 
change even in the oldest sectors. […]  Thus, a region’s technological capabilities are an outcome of 
a cumulative and collective history of technological advances embedded in entrepreneurial firms.’ 
(Best 2001: 81 – emphasis in original) 
 
 
14 | P a g e  
 
Figure 3.4  A cumulative model of cluster dynamics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Best (2001: 70, Figure 3.1 - adapted, bracketed annotation added) 
 
Entrepreneurial trajectories in Hollywood 
 
Candace Jones (2001) has conducted a fascinating historical analysis of the interaction 
between entrepreneurial careers, institutional rules and competitive dynamics in the 
early American film industry. Jones’s methodology combines realist and narrative 
approaches, while her conceptual framework draws on insights from co-evolutionary, 
institutional and resource-based theorising: 
 
‘Generative mechanisms are the underlying structures that drive processes (Pentland 1999) and 
in this study, they are firms’ institutional and strategic isolating mechanisms. A narrative 
approach illuminates how and why change occurs, by examining sequences of events (Van de 
Ven 1992) to reveal linkages amongst context and action (Pettigrew 1992)’. 
(Jones 2001: 913) 
 
The study makes use of a rich variety of qualitative and quantitative evidence, including 
firm-level archival data, published histories and industry statistics. These are used to 
probe the contrasting trajectories of ‘technology-driven’ and ‘content-oriented’ firms in 
an analytical scheme that encompasses the firms’ entrepreneurial practices, their 
capability-development and their co-evolutionary relationship an emerging structure of 
institutional rules (e.g. patent laws and artistic contracts). 
 
Entrepreneurial social capital changes 
 
James Bowey and Geoff Easton (2003) adopt a comparative case study approach, 
informed by a form of CR explanation, to examine the change of social capital in 
entrepreneurial network relationships. The two cases in this paper are based on 
contrasting business relationships involving one entrepreneur, ‘Jacques’, and two other 
actors. One of the cases records a process of social capital formation in a blossoming 
relationship, while the other traces a process of depreciation in a failing relationship. 
The narratives are framed using a common template that allows the researchers to probe 
for deeper ‘entities’ (i.e. structures), mechanisms and relationships. The research reveals 
similarities and differences that are not evident at the level of ‘surface’ events: 
Industrial district 
specialization and  
speciation dynamics 
[as region becomes a collective 
entrepreneur, displaying self-
organising agency] 
Entrepreneurial firms 
internal growth dynamics 
[as a result of neo-Penrosian 
technological capability and 
market opportunity interaction] 
New firms / activities 
technological diversification 
[as entrepreneurial firms create 
new sources of productive 
opportunity in the interstices] 
Inter-firm networks 
open systems dynamics 
[as flexibility is achieved through 
horizontal integration, yielding 
cluster-level opportunity] 
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‘Both mechanisms were different because while the entities were the same the necessary and 
contingent relationships were not only individually different but so was their configuration. As a 
result they worked in different ways to cause different changes in social capital.’  
(Bowey and Easton 1993: 18) 
 
However, the authors conclude that the most important conclusion coming from their 
in-depth analysis concerns the difficulty in specifying causal mechanisms. They 
compare the role played by entities (i.e. social structures) and mechanisms in a realist 
paradigm with that of variables and correlations found in the ‘positivist’ research. This 
prompts the reflection that, though positivism’s simple ‘linear additive configurations’ 
are unlikely to provide useful representations of reality, ‘it is difficult to think in any 
other way when seeking to ascribe reasonably precise causal explanations’ (ibid: 18-19). 
 
IS IT TIME FOR A ‘TEST-DRIVE’? 
 
In this chapter, I have assessed the potential of critical realism as a suitable vehicle for 
exploring the phenomenon of entrepreneurship, with a particular reference to qualitative 
research. I have presented five broad arguments in support of this view. Ultimately, any 
methodological innovation must be subjected to a simple evaluative question. In short, 
to what extent can it enhance our understanding of the phenomenon we are studying?  
The case for qualitative research informed by CR is that it has the potential to produce 
‘better stories’, that could form the basis for more sophisticated causal explanations. 
Perhaps the most important limitation in narrative-based qualitative research, and one 
that has long been recognised in the debate between ‘models’ and ‘histories’, is that the 
complexity and idiosyncracy of narrative data tend to ‘crowd out’ fundamental 
mechanisms and relationships. One of the claims of the critical realist perspective is that 
it provides a basis for theoretically-informed abstraction, reflecting Marx’s earlier 
notion of an histoire raisoneé. Thus, in the case of narrative-based research, CR 
demands a more rigorous and analytically sound periodisation of episodes than that 
found in much of the literature (Clark 2000: 115), with more explicit specifications of 
causality in the processes that it describes (Sayer 2000: 142-143). One thing is certain; 
the contribution of any methodology cannot be proven in the abstract. As the case 
examples have illustrated, there is much to gain from further testing and refinement in 
the field. This would be facilitated by a more creative interaction between the high 
ground of social theory and more earthly demands of empirical research. 
 
Critics and alternatives 
 
The principal case for CR is that offers the social scientist a distinctive methodological 
approach, which rejects both the naive optimism of those expecting to uncover law-like 
regularities from empirical data and the defeatism of those who deny any possibility of 
generalising our understanding of idiosyncratic phenomena such as entrepreneurship. 
As we have seen, CR is frequently presented as a kind of ‘third way’, providing a more 
sophisticated ontology than either empirical realism or postmodernism in its various 
forms (Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000: 4-10, Sayer 1992: 4-7). However, the CR 
paradigm has also been subjected to sustained criticism, extending from its 
philosophical roots to the empirical studies it has inspired. The most extensive attacks 
have been on CR’s social theoretic propositions, which have been seen as both 
internally inconsistent and unoriginal (e.g. Baert 1998: 195-197, Parsons 1999, Roberts 
2001). There has also been some questioning of the CR claim to provide a compelling 
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basis for social scientific methodology (Walters and Young 2001). The CR community 
has also proved to be an effective (self-)critic, mocking the ‘linguistic obscurity’ of 
some contributions to the CR literature (Junor 2001: 33), and warning against a 
common tendency to shift substantive social science issues, ‘into the terrain of 
philosophy.’ (Potter 2003: 163)  As the writer notes, the tendency is problematic 
because, ‘philosophy cannot do social science’s job.’ (ibid: 163)  With this thought in 
mind, sceptics might find themselves questioning the continuing shortage of substantive 
published studies that have adopted an explicitly CR methodology [13].  
 
In reflecting on these critiques, we should note that critical realists are not the only 
social theorists who promote a methodology based upon a search for the underlying 
generative mechanisms that connect different states or events. There is a long-standing 
debate in sociology, between proponents of variable-centred approaches that make 
extensive use of statistical modelling techniques, and those who argue for mechanism-
based theorising. Advocates of the ‘social mechanisms’ approach to sociological 
theorising, would agree with CR on the role played by mechanisms in the routine 
practice of social scientific research: 
 
‘The belief in explanations that provide accounts of what happens as it actually happens has 
pervaded the sociological literature for decades and has produced an abundance of detailed 
descriptive narratives but few explanatory mechanisms of any generality. It is through 
abstractions and analytical accentuation, however, that general mechanisms are made visible.’ 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 15) 
 
However, despite some commonality of purpose, there are important differences 
between the methodologies adopted by ‘social mechanisms’ scholars and those 
associated with CR. In the former case, empirical work tends to have a much stronger 
quantitative orientation and to be guided by the principles of methodological 
individualism. The ‘middle-range’ theorising advocated in this tradition is based on the 
argument that sociological researchers are equipped to pursue only relatively short 
causal histories (cf. Layder 1993: 19-37). In addition, while sharing with CR the 
assumption that social mechanisms, ‘usually are unobserved’, they are treated here as 
analytical constructs that simply assist in the process of theorising the links between 
observed events. In other words, these mechanisms, though ‘generative’, do not enjoy the 
special ontological status that is granted to them in the work of Harré and Bhaskar 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 7-17) [14].  
 
‘It is in practice ...’ 
 
By way of a closing comment, it seems appropriate to return to the metaphorical image 
of CR as potential a ‘vehicle’ for entrepreneurship research.  In the course of this 
chapter, I have reviewed a small proportion of a substantial CR literature that has been 
generated in a relatively short period, stimulated by the agenda-setting philosophical 
writings of Harré and Bhaskar that appeared in the 1970s. The review has focused on 
contributions from entrepreneurship researchers, and those in related fields, rather than 
those of social theorists. Despite this emphasis, one over-riding impression is that 
researchers have invested a disproportionate amount of energy in describing CR’s 
elaborate ontological features, and in debating the merits of its radical epistemological 
styling. The necessary investment in substantive research – let us call it ‘test driving’ 
CR – has been correspondingly underplayed. As a philosophy of science, transcendental 
realism was able to reflect on many centuries of empirical practice in the natural 
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sciences. By contrast, CR in the social sciences draws on a much thinner body of 
substantive work. If CR’s critics are to be believed, the tensions inherent in critical 
naturalism may direct entrepreneurship researchers elsewhere. For example, they may 
opt for less ambitious studies of particular aspects of entrepreneurship in a ‘social 
mechanisms’ framework, or construct much broader geo-historical narratives that are 
not constrained by social scientific conventions.  In any event, the final test will be an 
empirical one. As the renowned realist, Karl Marx (1818-1883), once observed, ‘it is in 
practice that we prove ... that our thought is true.’ 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 
 
It is good practice to trace ideas to their original source, but as Junor (2001: 30) has 
noted, the philosophical texts that underpin CR, such as Harré (1972) and Bhaskar 
(1975, 1979) are not necessarily the best starting-point for most empirical researchers. 
The alternative is to turn to other philosophers, such as Collier (1994), who offers a 
fairly accessible and critical introduction to Bhaskar’s ideas, or to scholars from other 
disciplines, who can mediate between the high plateaux of philosophy and the practical 
challenges of social science research. Leading contributors in the latter group include: 
Sayer (1992, 2000), who discusses the methodological implications of CR in various 
fields, with a particular focus on geo-historical research; Lawson (1997), whose broad 
methodological critique of ‘mainstream’ economics methodologies is grounded in a CR 
perspective; and Archer (1995), who develops a distinctive ‘morphogenetic’ approach, 
placing particular emphasis on the time dimension and engaging in a strong critique of 
structuration theory [15].  Much of this work is summarised by Danermark et al. (2002), 
who provide a clear and coherent introduction to critical realism in the social sciences, 
with particular emphasis on methodology and practical application. As noted 
previously, there are relatively few published accounts of CR as it has been applied in 
the field of entrepreneurship. However, the volumes edited by Ackroyd and Fleetwood 
(2000) and Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004) contain recent conceptual and empirical 
work in related areas of management and organisational studies (e.g. Porter’s (2000) CR 
ethnography), while the study by Whittington (1989) includes a CR-inspired 
methodological discussion. In order to develop a balanced view of CR, readers may also 
wish to pursue some of the leading critics, or to seek comparisons between CR and rival 
perspectives (e.g. Miri and Watson 2001, Mutch 2002). As noted above, there are many 
critiques of CR as social theory, but these tend to lack the methodological application 
that is of more immediate interest to empirical researchers. Walters and Young (2001) is 
an exception, with a challenge to CR’s methodological claims that is based on recent 
applications in the field of economics; the ‘debates’ section of Fleetwood (1999) 
contains some counter-arguments. 
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Footnotes 
 
 
1 Critical realism has had relatively limited exposure in the entrepreneurship 
literature, in contrast to its profile in related areas, such as organisation studies and 
economic geography. However, as the editors of this handbook have indicated, 
there is much to gain from a more critical discussion concerning the often-implicit 
methodological choices that are made by researchers in this field. 
 
2 This concern to develop ‘more open, context-dependent and plural’ accounts of the 
social world was echoed by the rise of postmodernism and post-structuralism, 
but argues that the development of CR in fields such as urban and regional 
studies happened ‘largely independently’ of their emergence (Sayer 2000: 5).  
 
3 ‘Necessary relations’ (or ‘necessity’) refer to things that must go together, given 
the nature of objects in the natural or social world, while ‘contingent relations’ 
(or ‘contigency’) refer to things that might go together. Researchers adopting a 
CR approach see the pursuit of questions about necessity as fundamental to the 
practice of theorising in the social sciences, forcing researchers to sharpen their 
conceptualisations of their objects of study. 
 
4 Sayer (2000: 33-35) mounts a strong defence of critical realism against the 
sceptical implication that social phenomena cannot be treated in the same way as 
their natural world counterparts (i.e. as ‘intransitive’ objects of study). However, as 
one of the reviewers has suggested, while analogies from nature may help to clarify 
CR’s unfamiliar ontological and epistemological claims, they should always be 
used sparingly and with careful ‘translations’ to social examples. 
5 Bhaskar (1975) presents a philosophical case for stratification and emergence, 
based on the existence of scientific practice. Realists argue that this proposition 
also corresponds to evidence from the natural and social worlds, giving examples 
such as the evolution of life on earth (Collier 1994: 46).  
 
6 Sayer (2000) provides an insight into the way this tension between the need for 
interpretive understanding and that of causal explanation was experienced in the 
course of his own empirical work: 
   
‘The empirical context was the prosaic one of studies of the development of urban and regional 
systems [...]. In attempting to develop an understanding of these that was both dynamic and 
spatial, it slowly dawned on me that social systems were necessarily open, and that they evolved 
rather than equilibrated, not least because people have the capacity to learn and change their 
behaviour. Consequently, I realized the goal of finding rough regularities, let alone laws, to 
describe social systems, was a pipe dream. At the same time, realist philosophy was beginning to 
challenge the regularity or secessionist theory of causation, and to analyse the explanation of 
change in open systems, so that it became clear that abandoning hopes of finding regularities in 
no way meant abandoning explanation.’ (Sayer 2000: 4-5) 
 
7 Retroduction breaks with Popper’s hypothetical-deductive form of scientific 
inference (Sayer 1992: 169-174). Popper’s falsificationist criterion of science, 
according to which a theory must be at least potentially falsifiable by empirical 
observation, was famously illustrated with reference to the appearance of a 
single black swan. Observation of this event was deemed sufficient to falsify the 
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theory that ‘all swans are white.’  Some scholars distinguish ‘abduction’ as a 
fourth mode of scientific inference, involving the theoretical redescription of 
underlying structures and relationships (Danermark et al. 2002: 88-95), while 
others incorporate into accounts of the retroductive process (cf. Lawson 1997). 
 
8 Recent studies pursuing a CR-inspired research agenda in this area (e.g. Blundel 
2002, Bowey and Easton 2003), can be contrasted with those adopting the more 
‘mainstream’ approach of inductive inference, based on the analysis of empirical 
regularities (i.e. the regression of variables derived from a questionnaire-based 
survey of owner-managers against concurrent firm-level measures of growth) 
(e.g. Adams and Hall 1993, Barkham et al. 1996). 
 
9 Edith Penrose asserts her realist credentials in a later and more light-hearted 
comment that seems to anticipate more recent critiques of postmodernist 
positions: 
 
‘Now none but the most philosophically sophisticated businessman will accept the proposition 
that the opportunities for the expansion of his firm are simply his ideas about what his firm can 
do; he will insist that the opportunities he sees reflect the “facts” of the world, facts that may be 
known with indifferent accuracy to be sure, but facts none the less’. (Penrose 1959: 216) 
 
10 This long-standing case for greater integration is reflected in Penrose’s (1953) 
critique of early evolutionary theorising by economists in relation to the growth 
of firms. Her argument anticipates CR’s rejection of deterministic explanations, 
on the grounds that they tend to abstract away the essential interplay between 
human cognition, agency and their environment: 
 
‘Once human will and motivation are recognized as important constituents of the situation, there 
is no a priori justification for assuming that firms, in their struggle for profits, will not attempt as 
much consciously to adapt the environment to their own purposes as to adapt themselves to the 
environment’. (Penrose 1953: 10) 
 
11 Other recent network-related studies adopting elements of the CR paradigm 
include Neergaard (1999), where the author explores the role of networks in the 
internationalisation of small furniture manufacturers, and Blundel (2002), which 
addresses the interplay between inter-organisational networks and institutional-
level changes in relation to contrasting growth processes in artisanal firms. 
 
12  The realist orientation of this analysis is reflected in its capacity to probe 
intermediate mechanisms and context-specific interactions. For example, in 
Best’s (2001) account of regional growth dynamics in Northern Ireland, poor 
performance in innovation and productivity is traced across several levels of 
analysis, to reveal a lack of growth engines. By layering the analysis in a 
dynamic, open-systems framework, Best is able to make connections between 
these mechanisms (e.g. the long-run shortage of new entrepreneurial firms can 
be related to the limited development of technology management capabilities at 
a regional level.).  
 
13 The shortage was evident from my own search for studies to illustrate this 
chapter, which yielded mostly implicit or quasi-realists. The editors of a leading 
CR text have reflected on this experience. While acknowledging that three (out 
of six) of their contributors illustrating contemporary realist practice ‘do not 
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make any explicit reference to realism’, they argue that in practice the field 
contains ‘much more work that is implicitly realist than that which is implicitly 
or explicitly postmodernist’. Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2000: 19) 
 
14 The authors cite Bhaskar (1975) in support of the argument that mechanism-based 
explanations usually invoke some sort of ‘causal agent’ that generates an observed 
relationship (Hedström and Swedberg  1998: 11). However, the ‘social 
mechanisms’ school take a contrary position to CR on the operation of these 
mechanisms, arguing that social world phenomena must always be explained on 
the basis of individual actors. This fundamental difference is clarified in the 
following statement: 
  
‘In the natural sciences, causal agents come in a variety of forms such as organic reactions in 
chemistry and natural selection in biology. In the social sciences, however, the elementary 
“causal agents” are always individual actors, and intelligible social science explanations should 
always include explicit references to the causes and consequences of their actions. This principle 
of methodological individualism is intimately linked to the core idea of the mechanism 
approach: Understanding is enhanced by making explicit the underlying generative mechanisms 
that link one state or event to another, and in the social sciences, actions constitute this link.’ 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 11-12) 
 
15 Archer (1995: 102) encapsulates her detailed critique of structuration theory by 
stating that it involves ‘sinking’ rather than ‘linking’ the essential differences 
between structure and agency (cf. Giddens 1984). By contrast, Archer’s 
procedure of ‘analytical dualism’ is based on the CR concept of emergence: 
social structures and human agency are different strata (hence ‘dualism’), whose 
interactions are only open to social scientific (hence ‘analytical’) inquiry. 
Danermark et al. (2002: 178-182) is a helpful summary of Archer’s arguments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
